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  The United States Constitution is a sacred instrument, establishing core values to guide the American people and 
guaranteeing rights that should remain steadfast in a world of change.  To ensure that these rights would not be 
subject to the whims of a monarchy or even of the people themselves, the authors of the Constitution placed these 
core values into a trust called the Bill of Rights.  In a like manner, the founders established a federal judicial system 
that was free from interference from other governmental powers and from the people.  Over time, the duty of 
defining the terms of the trust instrument fell to this independent judiciary, and the federal judiciary took on the role 
of trustee.  In general, a trustee protects and preserves trust property, and ensures that the property is employed 
solely for the beneficiaries, in accordance with the directions contained in the trust instrument. [FN1] Likewise, an 
independent judiciary protects and preserves our core values and individual rights in accordance with the 
Constitution.  The American people rely not only on the federal judicial system to serve as trustee; each state has its 
own judiciary charged with protecting these same values and individual rights.  In its role as trustee, the judiciary--
state and federal--has earned the confidence of the American public, who in turn peacefully accepts the judiciary's 
decisions in even the most contentious matters.  This confidence, however, is in jeopardy. 
 
  We hear political attacks on our courts daily.  The rhetoric is not respectful.  And the attacks go beyond words.  
Well-funded special interest groups target judges whose constitutional decisions *588 they consider adverse; state 
judges must respond by raising hundreds of thousands of dollars to survive a contested election.  This leads them to 
seek funds from lawyers and powerful interests who will later appear before their courts.  Other qualified judges are 
turned out of office solely because of their political party affiliation.  Intense and prolonged scrutiny of federal 
judicial nominees appointed by the President amounts to political hazing that scares off qualified candidates and 
delays the confirmation of much-needed judges. 
 
  Judge bashing intensified as the political disputes surrounding the outcome of the 2000 presidential election headed 
to the place where we always resolve our disputes: the state and federal courts.  Because the stakes were so high and 
the opposing camps so partisan, the critics of each decision grew more shrill and more irresponsible.  In the end, the 
United States Supreme Court determined the winner of the election by its decision in Bush v. Gore; [FN2] a bare 
majority of the United States Supreme Court pronounced unconstitutional the Florida Supreme Court's order to 
manually recount certain previously uncounted ballots to determine the voter's intent. [FN3]  Critics from the right 
characterized the Florida Supreme Court as irresponsible and critics from the left denounced the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion as partisan.  By and large, the American public accepted the result and swore in its new 
president, although many people denounced the Supreme Court's opinion as partisan and continue to do so.  The 
disrespectful attitude toward judges heightened by this dramatic conflict continues to reverberate and serves to 
undermine the faith and trust in the judiciary that made this resolution acceptable to the American public. 
 
  Whatever we think of the Bush v. Gore decision, or the outcome of the presidential election, we must not overlook 
the unique role that independent judges play in the constitutional form of government that we have chosen.  Our 
Constitution explicitly separates the function of government into the executive, [FN4] legislative, [FN5] and judicial 
[FN6] branches, in part to allow judges to decide disputes free from interference by either the chief executive or the 
legislature.  When judges are considered impartial and independent, *589 the public will trust their decisions, and 
this confidence is essential to a well-ordered society.  Additionally, by separating the powers of government, our 
Constitution confers exclusive functions on each branch that may not be performed by the other two. [FN7]  This 
prevents any one branch from assuming too many functions and establishes a system to check an abuse of power. 
 
  Soon after the Constitution was adopted, it was considered necessary to amend it to place certain of our core 
political values in trust.  The values that were considered so important that they needed to be protected from the 
 
government itself and from any mob constituting a majority were placed in our Bill of Rights.  This is the covenant 
that the founders made to the weak and powerless Americans as well as the strong and powerful: these rights belong 
to you and will be safeguarded for you.  But the Bill of Rights has no meaning unless it is given the force of law.  
Only an independent judiciary can serve the role of trustee to preserve rights that are unpopular in the heat of the 
moment and to protect individuals who are in the minority.  Serving as trustee, the judiciary--state and federal--has 
built up enormous capital by vigilantly and impartially protecting individual rights, even when the American public 
or its representatives had to be rebuked.  Despite inevitable dissatisfaction with some of its unpopular decisions, the 
judiciary as a whole has garnered the respect of a public that generally accepts its role of declaring the law. 
Individual rights will be preserved for the intended beneficiaries only so long as there is a trustee who stands above 
the political fray and is not dependent on the will of the majority. 
 
  Political attacks on judges have grown in scope and intensity in the wake of Bush v. Gore, threatening to intimidate 
judges and demoralize the entire judiciary.  They diminish public confidence in an impartial judiciary.  We are in 
danger of depleting the store of capital amassed over the last two hundred plus years that has allowed judges to 
make impartial decisions and protect individual rights.  An independent judiciary is essential to a constitutional 
democracy; without it we have no trustee capable of enforcing the terms of the constitutional trust instrument against 





Protecting the Trust of Constitutional Rights 
 
A. Formation of an Independent Judiciary 
 
  One of the grievances enumerated in our Declaration of Independence was that the English King George III "made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." 
[FN8]  For centuries in England, judges were removed from their positions when their decisions or actions 
displeased the king. [FN9]  King James II, for example, dismissed thirteen judges during his four-year reign, four in 
one day in 1686. [FN10]  Finally, in 1701 the English Parliament gave judges commissions to be served during good 
behavior, but this right was denied to judges in the American colonies. [FN11]  King George III justified this 
decision to keep colonial judges dependent on the monarch by saying that the state of learning in the colonies was so 
low that it was difficult to find competent men to administer the judicial office. [FN12]  In this climate, colonial 
litigants could have no confidence in the impartiality of judges who served at the whim of the English king. 
 
  How could our founders protect judges in their new government from this kind of monarchial, or executive, 
interference?  In 1780, a group of citizens led by John Adams drafted a constitution for the colony of Massachusetts 
[FN13] that called for all judges to be appointed by the governor, subject to the consent of his council, and to serve 
during good behavior. [FN14]  The historian Samuel Eliot Morison called this provision for life tenure for judges 
"one of John Adams's profoundest conceptions." [FN15]  This profound conception was adopted seven years later in 
Philadelphia *591 in the new Federal Constitution.  In addition to separating governmental powers into three 
branches, the Constitution provided: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office." [FN16]  As a result, federal judges in this country may resolve 
disputes without fear of removal by the chief executive, or fear of monetary penalties by the legislature.  This 
manner of securing judicial independence has proved to be a "mighty invention." [FN17] 
 
  Protecting judicial decision-making from external influences enables the independent judiciary to perform the 
unique role that judges have been given in our constitutional democracy.  The Constitution embraces certain 
political and moral values; it provides individuals equal protection under the law [FN18] and gives them certain 
rights--freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to a fair trial--that cannot be taken away by their 
government. [FN19]  A document standing alone, however, cannot preserve these rights; an independent institution 
must decide when the majority or its representatives have violated these core values.  When he introduced the 
amendments that were to become our Bill of Rights, James Madison envisioned judges as the keepers of the 
constitutional covenant:  
    [I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of th[e]se rights; 
 
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be 
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration 
of rights. [FN20] 
 
  In 1803, in Marbury v. Madison, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal judiciary's right to enforce 
the Constitution as law by striking down any legislative or executive act that violated a constitutional provision, a 
process we have come to call judicial review. [FN21]  Armed with this power of judicial review, *592 the 
independent judiciary assumed a special role as trustee of our inalienable rights. In addition to permitting the courts 
to interpret statutes and shape the common law, judicial review gives the courts the right to say no to the executive 
and legislative branches, and to the people themselves.  Our founders placed these rights in trust because they knew 
the people had to be protected from their own impulses. 
 
 
B. Role of the Independent Judiciary 
 
  A constitutional democracy relies on two countervailing principles.  First, the will of the majority should govern. 
[FN22]  Under this principle, the majority has the ultimate power to displace decision-makers and reject their policy. 
[FN23]  In tension with this notion is the second principle that constitutional rights, placed in trust for the benefit of 
individuals and minorities, usually trump the majoritarian will. [FN24]  "Democracy is not only majority rule.  
Democracy is also the rule of basic values, . . . values upon which the whole democratic structure is built, and which 
even the majority cannot touch," explained Aharon Barak, president of the Supreme Court of Israel. [FN25]  There 
must be an institution that strikes the balance between majority rule and a principled rule of law that protects 
individual rights.  "It must be an independent institution, not subject to the mercies of the majority or the minority. . . 
. [I]t must be the courts," announced Barak. [FN26] 
 
  Federal judges are in a position to protect these rights because they are placed beyond the direct control of the 
majority.  Although appointed by a President and confirmed by senators who are placed in office by the majority, 
federal judges are insulated from the majority will with life tenure. [FN27]  Many state judges, however, face direct 
election by the majority, and yet are expected to *593 perform the same role as federal judges by also enforcing 
federal constitutional rights. [FN28]  Nonetheless, all judges can discharge their functions, acting as trustees to 
preserve these constitutional rights, when they enjoy the respect and confidence of the people. 
 
  As trustees, judges protect these rights by interpreting the terms of the trust document, defining and applying core 
values.  The trustee-judge enforces these terms against the momentary desires of the people for their own long-term 
benefit.  Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court saw independent judges as "havens of refuge for 
those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non- 
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement." [FN29] 
 
  The will of the majority prevails, but it must prevail only under the authority of the Constitution. [FN30]  Robert 
Dahl, a leading democratic theorist, observed that "so far as I am aware, no one has ever advocated, and no one 
except its enemies has ever defined democracy to mean, that a majority would or should do anything it felt an 
impulse to do.  Every advocate of democracy . . . includes the idea of restraints on majorities." [FN31] Judicial 
independence fosters democratic ideals in the United States and "strengthens ordered liberty, domestic tranquility, 
[and] the rule of law . . . ." [FN32]  This constitutional model is our gift to the world: fundamental rights enforced by 
judges. [FN33]  "At least in our political *594 culture, it has proved superior to any alternative form of discharging 
the judicial function that has ever been tried or conceived." [FN34]  Resentment of the non-majoritarian role of 
independent judges, however, is no doubt fueling some of the present vocal attacks on our courts. When the people's 
elected representatives encroach on the role of the judiciary, or politicians or others intimidate individual judges, the 






Depleting the Capital 
 
A. Legislative Encroachment on Institutional Independence 
 
  The genius of our political system has been the concept of separating the power to govern into three independent 
branches.  Institutional independence promotes an independent judiciary by guaranteeing that neither the executive 
nor the legislative branch will interfere in the courts' business of administering justice. [FN35]  Through the Judicial 
Conference, the Administrative Office, and the Federal Judicial Center, the federal judiciary has grown into a 
cohesive branch of government, able to make policy, implement its own procedures, and train its own judges. 
[FN36]  Each state judiciary *595 has a similar structure. [FN37] 
 
  The courts must still rely on the goodwill of the legislature, however, for the funding required to administer justice. 
[FN38]  Courts cannot order the legislature to pass adequate budgets to build and maintain courtrooms, pay judges 
and judicial staff, purchase computers, or otherwise fund the judicial system. [FN39]  Some legislators may resent 
funding a supreme court that strikes down a major piece of legislation. [FN40]  Other legislators have challenged a 
supreme court's ability to pass rules of legal procedure, arguing that general rules should only be enacted by the 
legislature. [FN41] 
 
  In an effort to make judges "accountable," legislatures have imposed performance standards on courts for handling 
their busy dockets [FN42] and have even scrutinized judges about how they spend their time. [FN43]  In 1996, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's Oversight Subcommittee sent a survey to all federal appellate judges, including 
justices of the Supreme Court, asking how much time they spent on teaching, lecturing, writing scholarly articles, 
and traveling to make presentations; the senators also wanted to know how much compensation the judges received 
from their extracurricular activities. [FN44]  The survey results were then published, [FN45] and judges more 
publicly criticized for taking "judicial *596 junkets." [FN46] 
 
  Such public scrutiny suggests that the United States Senate has the authority to police the professional activities of 
appellate judges.  It has caused the federal judiciary at times to respond like an "agency" seeking to justify its 
existence to Congress: "Federal judges, nervous about the next questionnaire coming from Congress, appear ready 
to placate and to mollify." [FN47]  The Executive Committee of the United States Judicial Conference responded to 
the Senate survey by explaining that "[f]ederal judges have a long and distinguished history of service to the legal 
profession through their writing, speaking, and teaching," and suggesting that the dialogue between judges, lawyers, 
and law students should be encouraged, not thwarted. [FN48]  When the judiciary is treated like an agency that must 
justify its performance, it is in danger of losing its independence in administering justice. Institutional pressure can 
become so extreme that it cows judges into making safe decisions that will not offend the legislatures who fund the 
courts.  Even more threatening is the direct political pressure increasingly used to intimidate judges, especially state 
judges who must face contested elections. 
 
 
B. Political Encroachment on Decisional Independence 
 
  John Adams's profound conception for ensuring judicial independence was to give judges job security for life. 
[FN49]  Life tenure removes judges from the majority will, enabling them to decide a case solely on the basis of 
their judgment about the facts and law, without consideration of any other interests. [FN50]  This is the crown *597 
jewel of judicial independence embedded in Article III of our Federal Constitution. [FN51] 
 
  But Professor Judith Resnik warns us not to center our hope for judicial independence on this crown jewel. [FN52]  
One commentator estimates that fewer than three percent of the judges in our nation hold life tenure. [FN53]  Of the 
more than 28,000 state judges, [FN54] only those in Rhode Island serve for life or good behavior. [FN55]  Contrary 
to popular belief, not all federal judges enjoy this privilege.  Resnik points out that as judicial needs have grown, 
Congress has chosen to create a large body of non- life-tenured statutory judges, rather than expand the number of 
Article III constitutional judges. [FN56]  The numbers tell the story. [FN57]  There are nine justices of the Supreme 
Court and some 265 appellate judges serving the thirteen circuits. [FN58]  At the trial level, there are 919 district 
judges. [FN59]  These 1,184 federal judges all have the constitutional protection of life tenure. [FN60]  But there are 
 
874 statutory judges who serve as bankruptcy or magistrate judges for fixed terms. [FN61]  Bankruptcy judges are 
appointed by appellate judges *598 for fourteen years; magistrate judges are appointed by district judges for eight 
years. [FN62]  These federal statutory judges are nonetheless removed from the will of the majority, as they are 
appointed by life-tenured judges for a fixed term. [FN63] 
 
  Many state judges, however, must stand for contested or retention election, jeopardizing their independence.  
Elected state judges must enforce federal constitutional rights as well as rights under their state constitution.  
Litigants in state courts are entitled to a jury [FN64] and the right of confrontation. [FN65]  Criminal defendants are 
afforded a speedy trial [FN66] and the right to remain silent. [FN67]  Capital punishment in a state court may not be 
imposed in circumstances declared to be cruel and unusual under the federal constitution. [FN68]  Enforcing the 
rights of a vicious criminal or an unpopular minority can make a state court judge vulnerable to ouster by a voting 
majority in some form of judicial election. 
 
  Although most states initially adopted some method of appointing judges,  [FN69] a wave of anti-elitism in the 
nineteenth century nudged many states to embrace the popular election of judges. [FN70]  Vermont, Georgia, and 
Indiana were among the first states to adopt an elective system for some judges. [FN71]  During the Jacksonian 
period, a sweeping sentiment for more democratic access led to popular election of all judges in Mississippi in 1832. 
[FN72]  Other states soon followed suit. [FN73]  Between 1846 and 1958, all states joining the Union chose to elect 
judges, and many existing states amended their constitutions to elect some or all of their judges. [FN74]  Ironically, 
this reform was intended to separate politics from the bench: "Proponents of popular election insisted that the 
appellate judiciary had suffered because governors and legislators had distributed judgeships on the basis of 'service 
to the party' rather than on the 'legal skills or judicial temperament' of *599 appointees." [FN75] 
 
  One of the most articulate advocates for judicial elections in this era was Frederick Grimke, chief justice of the 
Ohio Supreme Court in the mid-nineteenth century. [FN76]  In 1848, Grimke noted in The Nature and Tendency of 
Free Institutions that life tenure, once necessary to make judges independent of a monarch, was out of place in a 
republic where both the executive and legislative branch serve limited terms. [FN77]  He suggested that electing 
judges for a term of years would be compatible with an independent judiciary, while giving judges a greater sense of 
responsibility. [FN78]  He wrote:  
    It is a great mistake to suppose that because the judges are called to expound the principles of an abstruse science 
that they should be insensible to the general movement of the age and country in which they are born; . . . .  There is 
no public magistrate whose mind will not be enlarged and liberalized, whose views will not be rendered both more 
wise and just, by catching something from the influence of . . .  public opinion . . . . [FN79] 
 
  Justice Grimke was persuaded that judges should submit their minds "to the healthful influence" of public opinion 
because the power of expounding and shaping the law was quite similar to the power of legislating. [FN80] Because 
life tenure was unacceptable for the legislature, it should not be granted to judges. [FN81] 
 
  The trend to "democratize" the judiciary has succeeded by a wide measure.  Today, judges are elected in thirty-
eight states; in twelve states most judges are appointed by the executive with some form of legislative confirmation. 
[FN82]  Twenty-three states have judges standing for election initially and periodically for reelection. *600[ FN83]  
Ten of these states have partisan judicial elections; thirteen have nonpartisan elections. [FN84] Fifteen states have 
some version of the merit plan, judges being appointed by the governor and then standing for periodic reelection, 
either for retention or against another candidate. [FN85] 
 
  Sadly, a trend to "politicize" judicial elections has followed.  Today the genteel elections envisioned in the 
nineteenth century have been replaced by noisy and nasty judicial campaigns that are only one part of a concerted 
attack on individual judges and courts generally.  Elected judges who strive to perform their role as trustees of 
individual rights and impartial decision- makers are unquestionably more vulnerable to attack than appointed judges.  
The late Otto Kaus, a California Supreme Court justice in the 1980s, coined a colorful metaphor for the dilemma he 
faced in deciding controversial cases while standing for reelection: "[I]t was like finding a crocodile in your bathtub 
when you go in to shave in the morning.  You know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to think 
about much else while you're shaving." [FN86] 
 
  From the beginning, the founders of this nation understood the importance of an independent judiciary in 
preserving the rule of law under which we have chosen to live.  John Adams favored life tenure with a guaranteed 
 
salary. [FN87]  But over the years, in their role as laboratories, the states have experimented with different selection 
methods to keep our judges both independent and responsive.  In the nineteenth century, reformers like Justice 
Grimke sought to make judges more responsive to the people by removing life tenure. [FN88]  In the Jacksonian 
period, it was thought that governors and legislators were appointing their political cronies to the bench and that the 
best way to remove judges from *601 politics was to let the people elect them. [FN89]  Now, more than a hundred 
years later, popular elections have become so politicized that we are pressed to seek new reforms to preserve an 
independent judiciary. 
 
  In a ringing condemnation of today's popular elections, Tom Phillips, the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 
recently warned the Texas Legislature that popular election of judges has outlived its time: "Popular elections 
perhaps yielded more qualified and more independent judges as long as the judges were few, the candidates were all 
of one color, class, gender and political party, the electorate was informed, and the campaigns were inexpensive.  
Those days are gone." [FN90] 
 
  What has changed?  Qualified judges are removed from office, for example, simply because of their political party 
affiliation.  In Texas alone, a number of factors contributed to the defeat of more than two hundred judges at the 
polls in the last twenty years. [FN91]  Judicial campaigning has become costly and contentious and highly partisan. 
[FN92]  The only practical way to reach the public is through expensive media, especially television. [FN93]  There 
are too many contested judicial races for the public to be adequately informed. [FN94]  Further, well-funded special 
interest groups have organized to defeat judges who issue unpopular constitutional decisions. [FN95]  Chief Justice 
Phillips asked the legislature, "[i]s it still a reform to make judges raise thousands, hundreds of thousands, or 
millions of dollars from the bar or other interested persons to run for office?" [FN96] I think not.  A recent survey 
reports that eighty-three percent of Texans believe that campaign contributions have a significant effect on judicial 
decisions. [FN97]  Beyond *602 the expense of judicial campaigns, elected judges must face increasingly angry and 
well-organized special interest groups eager to intimidate and defeat judges on the basis of unpopular judicial 
decisions. 
 
  Attacks on judges take many forms.  A state judge who reverses a death penalty, or suppresses evidence in a 
criminal case, or issues any decision touching on the right to abortion is subject to attack.  She may face well- 
financed opposition in her next election.  She may be vilified by a widespread campaign of distortion that extends 
not only to her but to her political supporters.  The judge who strikes down any popular initiation measure knows 
that the same well-organized group that promoted the issue is capable of demoting a judge who restrains it.  
Politicians may denounce a judge for their own political gain, singling out individual decisions adverse to their 
interests.  Even federal judges may be intimidated during their confirmation process or after they take the bench.  
Intimidation that interferes with how a judge enforces the rights our founders placed in trust gives control to the 
beneficiary instead of the trustee.  The covenant to protect our core values for the long-term benefit of all the people 
cannot survive without independent trustee-judges. 
 
  Failure to affirm the death penalty has caused countless judges to be defeated or challenged. [FN98]  For example, 
the chief justice and two other justices of the California Supreme Court were removed by a retention election in 
1986 after the governor threatened to have them defeated if they did not uphold more death penalties. [FN99]  They 
did not bow to his threats and he successfully organized a statewide campaign to oppose their reelection. [FN100] 
 
  Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court joined her four colleagues in a unanimous opinion 
remanding a death penalty case for a new sentencing hearing because of evidence excluded in the first hearing; she 
did not author the opinion. [FN101]  *603 Before she knew what had happened, she was the target of a smear 
campaign that resulted in her defeat in a nonpartisan retention election in 1996. [FN102]  One campaign brochure 
stated about Justice White: "Richard Odom was convicted of repeatedly raping and stabbing to death a 78 year old 
Memphis woman.  However, Justice White felt the crime wasn't heinous enough for the death penalty--so she struck 
it down." [FN103]  Noting this intimidation, Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court declared:  
    [J]udges who covet higher office--or who merely wish to remain judges--must constantly profess their fealty to 
the death penalty. . . . The danger that they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly 
publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George III. [FN104] 
 




  A justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, James Robertson, was defeated in 1992 by a "law and order" opponent 
for expressing, in a concurring opinion, his belief that the Constitution did not permit the death penalty for rape 
when there was no loss of life. [FN105]  Twelve years earlier the United States Supreme Court had found that the 
imposition of the death penalty in such cases was cruel and unusual punishment. [FN106] 
 
  Any judge, state or federal, who suppresses evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment will 
encounter political enemies and be labeled "soft on crime."  In 1996, Senator Robert Dole called for the 
impeachment of Judge Harold Baer, who suppressed cocaine and heroin seized by New York police officers. 
[FN107]  Not wanting to be perceived as soft on crime, the Clinton White House suggested it would ask for the 
judge's resignation if he did not reverse the ruling. [FN108]  Judge Baer reversed himself. [FN109] 
 
  The politically cowed trial court judge may be lax in guaranteeing the rights of criminal defendants or requiring 
competent *604 counsel, parts of the every day administration of justice.  One of the most embarrassing examples 
comes from Texas, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals failed to reverse a judgment imposing the death 
penalty even though the defendant's attorney slept through major portions of the trial. [FN110]  No other recent case 
has so undermined the public's trust in the judiciary, causing something akin to gallows laughter at the expense of 
the judges. [FN111] 
 
  Abortion decisions also provoke heated controversy. As Laurence Tribe, a law professor and frequent appellate 
advocate, has explained:  
    [T]he depth of the division between the pro-choice and pro-life tendencies appears to reflect not simply different 
perspectives on the value of fetal life but different orientations toward matters of tradition, change, sex, and power.  
Such differences in turn reflect class and culture in ways that cut across the divide between Democrats and 
Republicans in our political life. [FN112] 
 
  As states have passed parental consent bills, partial-birth abortion bills, guidelines for judicial permission in lieu of 
parental *605 consent, restraints on funding abortions for welfare mothers, and other measures impinging on the 
right to abortion, judges have declared certain of these measures unconstitutional, [FN113] but always at a high cost 
to themselves. 
 
  When the Florida Supreme Court struck down a statute requiring parental consent for abortion in 1989, [FN114] 
the judges who joined that opinion were targeted for defeat by powerful pro-life coalitions in that state. [FN115]  
Justice Leander Shaw, the first African-American chief justice to preside over the court, authored the opinion. 
[FN116]  He had to raise and spend $300,000 to escape defeat in his 1990 retention election. [FN117] Justice 
Rosemary Barkett, who joined the opinion, was opposed two years later by the same right-to-life forces and by an 
organized coalition of prosecutors and police, unhappy that she had dissented in one controversial death penalty 
case--no matter that she had voted to affirm over two hundred death penalties during the previous nine years! 
[FN118]  Justice Barkett raised and spent $230,000 to retain her seat on the court. [FN119]  After she was confirmed 
for an appointment to the Eleventh Circuit in 1994, Senator Dole included Judge Barkett in his "Judicial Hall of 
Shame." [FN120] 
 
  Highly charged judicial politics have become issues in other political races.  Michael Huffington challenged 
Dianne Feinstein for her United States Senate seat from California, attacking her for voting to confirm Judge 
Barkett's nomination to the federal appellate bench. [FN121]  His full-page advertisements included distortions of 
real cases, similar to the tactics used against Justice White in Tennessee: [FN122]  "Jacob Dougan brutally killed a 
teenage boy . . . [and] sent a tape to the boy's mother describing her son's murder. . . . [A] judge named Rosemary 
Barkett voted to spare Dougan the death penalty.  Judge Barkett believed that a lifetime of discrimination explained 
Dougan's actions--so she let *606 him off the hook." [FN123]  In Tennessee, Bill Frist successfully used the same 
judge-bashing technique to defeat Senator Jim Sasser. [FN124]  Frist appeared at a news conference with the sister 
of a murder victim, complaining that Sasser had nominated the federal judge who had granted habeas corpus relief 
to the murderer. [FN125] In addition, Frist lambasted Sasser for voting to confirm Judge Barkett, saying this showed 
that he "still hasn't learned his lesson." [FN126] 
 
  Another matter of concern for the judiciary is the popular initiative, a process whereby the people can propose and 
vote on a legislative matter directly when they feel their legislators have been unresponsive. [FN127] Former Chief 
 
Justice Warren Burger noted that initiatives are entitled to no greater deference than statutes: "[T]he voters may no 
more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting 
legislation." [FN128]  But the judge who strikes down an initiative faces a highly organized and well-funded group 
ready to unseat him at the next opportunity. When Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska Supreme Court authored 
a unanimous opinion striking down a term limits initiative, its sponsors quickly organized to raise $200,000 to defeat 
him in 1996. [FN129]  He became the first justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court ever to be removed by the voters. 
[FN130]  The populist movement that bred initiatives threatens to impose even more direct pressure on judges who 
reject their proposals. 
 
  Those who employ tactics of distortion, directly and indirectly attacking particular judges for particular opinions, 
acknowledge that their efforts are aimed at removing judges who disagree with *607 their views and intimidating 
other judges who wish to remain on the bench.  When the California Supreme Court considered its own statute 
guaranteeing the right of privacy in 1996, right-to-life forces rattled their sabers in an attempt to influence two new 
justices on the court. [FN131]  Former United States Attorney General Ed Meese spoke for the Parents Rights 
Coalition: "The judges ought to know that the public is watching their actions.  That's why they come up for election 
every 12 years." [FN132]  More menacingly, Tom DeLay, a congressman from Texas, has advocated the 
impeachment of federal judges who do not follow his view of the law, saying point-blank that the judges "'need to 
be intimidated." ' [FN133] 
 
  Nearly two hundred years ago we denounced this political use of the impeachment process when Congress rejected 
Thomas Jefferson's attempt to impeach Chief Justice Samuel Chase for his judicial opinions. [FN134]  In 211 years, 
the House of Representatives has impeached only thirteen federal judges and only seven of those have been 
convicted by the Senate, [FN135] all for crimes such as bribery, tax evasion, and racketeering--never for the content 
of their judicial opinions. [FN136]  Political sentiments to reverse this tradition in the name of intimidation are 
troublesome: "An intimidated judge is a worthless judge." [FN137] 
 
  It is irresponsible to mischaracterize a judge's ruling for political gain, or to attack one judge for the purpose of 
bullying those who remain on the bench.  Those are the tactics that put a crocodile in every judge's bathtub. Even 
one federal judge with life tenure was shaken by the attacks of Senator Dole and others.  Judge H. Lee Sarokin, who 
resigned from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, explained: "[T]he first moment I considered 
whether or how an opinion I was preparing would be used [politically] was the moment I decided that I could *608 
no longer serve as a federal judge." [FN138]  We no longer have an independent judiciary capable of safeguarding 
our rights when judges can be defeated because of an unpopular decision or can be coerced into reversing their 






Testing Confidence in the Judiciary: Bush v. Gore 
 
  Throughout our history, judicial independence has been a core political value in the United States. [FN139]  Courts 
are not perceived as instruments of the state.  There is a cultural expectation that judges behave independently, that 
they decide cases according to principles of law, not partisanship, and that public officials and private interests are 
not to tamper with judicial decision-making. [FN140]  Justice Stephen Breyer has celebrated this expectation: 
"[J]udicial independence is a matter of expectation, habit, and belief among not just judges, lawyers, and legislators, 
but millions of other citizens." [FN141]  A 1998 Gallup poll revealed that seventy-eight percent of Americans 
expressed more confidence in the judicial branch than in either of the other two branches of government. [FN142] 
 
  In the ultimate test of the public's confidence in the judiciary, the American people were willing to have the 
outcome of the 2000 presidential election be determined by the United States Supreme Court.  Alexis de Toqueville 
explained that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a 
judicial question." [FN143]  In this democracy, nine appointed justices with life tenure substituted their decision for 
the decision of the electorate, which to most observers was too close to call.  Many urged the Court to intervene: 
*609 "The Supreme Court . . . [can] put its imprimatur on the best way to decide who shall occupy the presidency.  
And the vast majority of Americans would readily accept the decision." [FN144]  After the Court made its decision, 
 
many observers feared that the Court had squandered the people's trust with an essentially political act that found no 
support in the law.  I would like to review part of the drama of that extraordinary decision before commenting on its 
impact on judicial independence. 
 
 
A. The Conflict 
 
  Out of some six million votes cast in Florida, George W. Bush's lead was so razor-thin that Al Gore looked for 
election irregularities that might have influenced the outcome. [FN145]  Unfortunately, there were many.  First, the 
confusing "butterfly" ballot in Palm Beach County, listing candidates to the left and right of the voting spaces, 
caused many voters to vote twice, or to vote for the wrong candidate. [FN146]  There were also protests that 
thousands of votes had not been counted by voting machines because the "chad" indicating voter preference had not 
been completely perforated from the ballot. [FN147]  These were the "undervotes," [FN148] which fell into several 
categories such as "hanging chads" (those partially perforated and hanging from one corner) and "pregnant chads" 
(those with an indentation indicating an unsuccessful attempt to perforate the ballot). [FN149] Additionally, there 
were complaints of organized attempts to remove African- American voters from the voting rolls and to intimidate 
others who attempted to vote. [FN150]  Finally, there were massive attempts to validate or invalidate overseas 
ballots in various counties, resulting in disparate procedures for accepting or rejecting ballots with late postmarks or 
no postmark at all. [FN151] 
 
  *610 Manual recounts were called for in four large counties,  [FN152] but the process was slow. [FN153]  As 
recounts continued on November 14, the date set for certifying Florida's vote, Florida Secretary of State Katherine 
Harris threatened to certify Bush the official winner. [FN154]  The Florida Supreme Court issued an injunction, 
however, preventing her from certifying the results until further order from that court. [FN155]  On November 21, 
the Florida Supreme Court interpreted its own law and extended the deadline for certifying the Florida vote until 
November 26, adding twelve days to allow the recounting to be completed. [FN156]  On November 26, Harris 
certified the vote, which at that point gave Bush a 537- vote lead. [FN157] 
 
  Gore challenged the November 26 certification, complaining about the manner in which the manual recounts were 
being conducted and especially that Miami- Dade County had discontinued recounts. [FN158]  He asked a Florida 
trial court judge to throw out the *611 certification and start the recounting over. [FN159]  The circuit court refused 
to invalidate the certified outcome and Gore appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. [FN160]  That court reversed, 
ordering the circuit court to commence tabulating undervotes in Miami-Dade County and to implement other 
statewide relief, strongly advising that the circuit court order a recount of all undervotes statewide, estimated to 
include some 75,000 ballots. [FN161] 
 
  The Bush team responded with unusually personal and disrespectful attacks on the Florida Supreme Court.  The 
speaker of the Florida House of Representatives railed that the justices "sent a message that . . . they don't respect us 
and they don't respect the voters of Florida." [FN162]  Even Bush himself accused the judges of using the bench "to 
change Florida's election laws and usurp the authority of Florida's election officials." [FN163] 
 
  The recounts started again all over Florida, but not for long.  Bush appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which accepted the appeal the very next day.  This surprised many court observers who never expected the Court to 
involve itself in such a highly political dispute. [FN164]  Then, in a stunning five to four decision, the justices 
stopped the vote counting in Florida, pending their decision on the merits. [FN165]  Gone was the Court's 
characteristic civility.  Each side warned that the other was casting a cloud of illegitimacy over the presidential 
election. [FN166] 
 
  In the meantime, one deadline loomed.  The Electoral College *612 would meet to formally elect the President on 
December 18. [FN167]  But electors not certified before December 12 were not guaranteed a "safe harbor," meaning 
Congress could challenge the slate of electors. [FN168]  In retrospect, we know that twenty states failed to meet the 
December 12 deadline for certifying electors without jeopardizing their slates, but the outcome of the election was 
not disputed in any of those states. [FN169] 
 
  Against this background, the United States Supreme Court moved with untoward speed, receiving briefs on a 
Sunday, hearing oral argument on Monday, and issuing a sixty-five page decision on Tuesday. [FN170]  The timing 
 
of the decision seemed especially cynical, coming as it did two hours before midnight on December 12, a date the 
majority of the court held was the absolute deadline for certifying Florida votes. [FN171] 
 
  In another five to four decision that drew bitter dissent, the majority held that allowing the recounts to proceed 
under Florida's vague "intent-of-the- voter" standard violated the due process and equal protection rights of voters in 
that state. [FN172]  Ironically, this "equal protection" rationale was posited by the five conservative justices who 
have generally rejected constitutional arguments grounded in equal protection. [FN173]  Further, those same 
justices, who traditionally champion state's rights, [FN174] were unwilling to defer to the Florida Supreme Court's 
interpretation of its state law concerning the deadline for certifying votes. [FN175]  Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas said the Florida court violated its own state law in ordering the recount. [FN176]  
Finally, the majority concluded there was not time to remand for a constitutional recount using a uniform standard 
because Florida law required the completion of all vote counts by December 12, a deadline that would expire less 
than two hours *613 after the opinion was announced. [FN177] 
 
  Four dissenting opinions issued.  Two dissenters, Justices Breyer and Souter, shared the majority's concerns about 
the unequal standards employed for recounting ballots in the various counties, but they rejected the notion that either 
Florida law or federal law made December 12 an absolute deadline for certifying Florida votes. [FN178]  Justice 
Souter wrote, "There is no justification for denying the State the opportunity to try to count all disputed ballots." 
[FN179]  Both Justices Breyer and Souter cited federal law that required the counting of votes certified before the 
true deadline of December 18 and would have remanded with instructions for the recount to proceed according to 
some uniform standard and to be certified before the Electoral College convened. [FN180]  Two dissenters, Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg, rejected Bush's equal protection claims altogether. [FN181] 
 
  Harsh language issued from the dissenters on the Court.  Justice Breyer warned that the majority risked "a self-
inflicted wound--a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation." [FN182]  Justice Stevens charged that 
the majority opinion "can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the 
land." [FN183]  Even more withering was his comment, "Although we may never know with complete certainty the 
identity of the winner of this year's presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.  It is the Nation's 
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." [FN184] 
 
 
B. The Aftermath 
 
  Attacks on the judiciary were particularly harsh immediately following Bush v. Gore.  Over time, however, the 
criticism has splintered.  Harsh denunciation of the United States Supreme Court has evolved into a mostly 
thoughtful critique while critics continue to censure the Florida Supreme Court.  The repercussions *614 for other 
courts are less clear, although the reputation of the judiciary is plainly affected by the events. 
 
 
1. The United States Supreme Court 
 
  Not all criticism of Bush v. Gore was negative.  Some commentators praised the Court for saving the country from 
a constitutional crisis. [FN185]  Most of its supporters contended it was the only institution with the legitimacy to 
bring this partisan struggle to an end. [FN186]  One asserted that if the Supreme Court had not intervened, the 
political tension would have "created a train wreck." [FN187]  Indeed, following the December 12 decision, a 
majority of Americans, sixty-one percent, said they preferred having the high court resolve the election. [FN188]  
According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, seventeen percent trusted Congress to decide the election, nine 
percent preferred the Florida Supreme Court, *615 and seven percent the Florida legislature. [FN189] 
 
  Many critics, however, asserted that the Supreme Court had undermined its legitimacy and damaged the reputation 
of judges all across the nation. [FN190]  These critics took two stances: that the Supreme Court acted politically, 
[FN191] and that the majority decision was unprincipled. [FN192]  The critics explained that the Supreme Court has 
never decided that ballots, not counted with absolute precision, should not be counted at all. [FN193]  "[E]ven more 
chilling," others suggested, is the intrusion on states' rights. [FN194]  Some of those praising the Supreme Court for 
stepping into the fray criticized the Court's legal analysis.  Robert Bork, a former conservative Supreme Court 
nominee, argued that reliance on the Equal Protection Clause raises serious difficulties.  He stated that the disparities 
 
the majority said raised equal protection problems "have always existed within states under our semi-chaotic 
election processes.  By raising that to the level of a constitutional violation, the court federalized state election 
laws." [FN195] 
 
  *616 An associate law professor at Georgetown University, Neal Kumar Katyal, predicted four dire consequences 
likely to be visited on the Court. [FN196]  First, he contended the Senate would most certainly block attempts to fill 
vacancies on the court. [FN197]  Second, he feared lower court judges may begin to dismiss what the Supreme 
Court says in its decisions. [FN198]  Third, he predicted a new academic movement dedicated to exposing the 
Supreme Court's political biases. [FN199]  Finally, he expected that Supreme Court practitioners, traditionally 
sophisticated legal advocates, will have to behave more like lobbyists. [FN200] 
 
  The United States Supreme Court, however, has moved beyond Bush v. Gore.  Justice Ginsburg, one of the 
dissenters, was among the first to urge the critics to overcome their initial cynicism: "Whatever final judgment 
awaits Bush v. Gore . . . I am certain that the good work and good faith of the U.S. federal judiciary as a whole will 
continue to sustain public confidence at a level never beyond repair." [FN201]  One Bush observer explained that 
the Supreme Court was not in jeopardy of losing "its well-deserved reputation as the guardian of the rule of law" 
unless the justices themselves or legal analysts perpetuate or encourage "the sinister notion of judgment by partisan 
affiliation by airing their frustrations in exaggerated dissent or commentary." [FN202]  One of the Court's harshest 
critics [FN203] admits that the justices have responded in their subsequent opinions this term with moderate views 
that demonstrate their attempt at nonpartisanship. [FN204] 
 
  Several justices have undertaken surprising positions in otherwise predictable opinions.  Justice Scalia abandoned 
his disdain *617 for privacy rights by writing for the majority in Kyllo v. United States, [FN205] which held that the 
police could not use a thermal imaging device to detect marijuana growing in a home. [FN206]  Justice Breyer, who 
reliably supports separation of church and state, agreed with conservative justices that a public school must open its 
doors to after-hours religious activities. [FN207]  Justice Souter wrote an opinion allowing the police to arrest and 
search a "Texas soccer mom" whose children were not wearing seat belts, [FN208] even though he is normally 
sensitive to the need to control the discretion of police. [FN209]  Alan Dershowitz explained it this way: "As 
surprising as these votes and decisions may be, they all show a common direction.  Bush v. Gore seems to have 
exerted a gravitational pull toward the center for at least some of the justices." [FN210] 
 
  Just as the Supreme Court justices have attempted to dispel a partisan image, critics have backed down from any 
widespread call to reprimand an overreaching court. [FN211]  We hear "[n]o clamors for impeachment or curtailing 
the jurisdiction or powers of the high court. . . ." [FN212]  One commentator explained, "passions in the wake of 
Bush v. Gore have cooled." [FN213] 
 
 
2. The Florida Supreme Court 
 
  As for the Florida Supreme Court, criticism remains harsh and conservative groups are currently seeking to oust 
the three supreme court justices who face the most immediate retention elections. *618[ FN214]  The criticism in 
Florida, however, has gone beyond words with actual attempts to undermine the authority of the Florida Supreme 
Court.  Although the court has been lauded as "one of the best state supreme courts in the country," [FN215] 
"enjoy[ing] an excellent reputation," [FN216] some critics threatened that "[i]mpeachment is too good for the Gang 
of Seven.  Arrest, indictment and trial are the best response to the court's misuse of judicial office to facilitate the 
attempted theft of a presidential election," stated one nationally syndicated columnist. [FN217]  This critic urged 
Republicans to "muster the courage to put the judiciary in its place before judges usurp representative democracy in 
the United States." [FN218]  Another reporter blamed the Florida Supreme Court for the deep division in the 
country, "precisely because four naive and activist judges on [that court] interrupted with judicial adventurousness 
the nation's process of accepting the election outcome." [FN219] 
 
  The criticism seems meek compared to other actions taken.  Prior to the election, the Florida legislature attempted 
to undermine the Florida Supreme Court's authority, [FN220] unhappy with the court for decisions affecting the 
legislators' management of the budget and striking down efforts to speed up imposition of the death penalty. 
[FN221]  The legislature attempted to purge all judicial nominating commissioners named by the predecessors of 
Governor Jeb Bush, to pack the court by increasing its membership from seven to nine, and to strip the court of 
 
death penalty cases by establishing a statewide court of criminal appeals. [FN222]  During the spring following 
Bush v. Gore, the "Florida legislature has gone to war with state judges," attempting to give the governor *619 total 
control of judicial appointments, to strip the court of some jurisdiction, and again, to add two seats. [FN223] 
 
  Meanwhile, two Republican-led groups have begun attempts to unseat three Florida Supreme Court justices. 
[FN224]  The Emergency Florida State Supreme Court Project [FN225] has sought donations to oust Chief Justice 
Charles T. Wells along with Justices Leander J. Shaw Jr. and Harry Lee Anstead, all three Democratic appointees 
facing retention elections in 2002 and 2003. [FN226] In a fund-raising letter, the Republican county commissioner 
in Palm Beach County called the court's behavior "an outrageous, arrogant, power-grab by a left-wing court which is 
stuck in the liberal 60's." [FN227]  The commissioner lambasted all three even though two of the three, Chief Justice 
Wells and Justice Shaw, dissented from the Florida Supreme Court's four to three ruling ordering the statewide hand 
count, which was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. [FN228]  A third group, Balance to 
the Bench, wants to raise about $1 million to oust Justice Anstead. [FN229] 
 
  Observers in Florida are concerned that these efforts are undermining the judicial independence of Florida courts.  
A Democrat who campaigned for Bush said he would form a committee to help the judges beat the recall effort 
because "the effort to unseat the justices [is] an  unnecessary intrusion of politics into the judiciary." [FN230]  Lois 
Frankel, the minority leader in the Florida House stated, "When you drag the courts into the political arena, you are 
ensuring that they will be political. . . . This violates the whole principle of separation of powers." [FN231] 
 
 
3. Other Courts 
 
  Once the judiciary became involved in the 2000 presidential election, the media began "mentioning the previous 
party affiliations of the various judges sitting on the multitudinous lawsuits." *620[ FN232]  This trend has 
continued. [FN233]  But as Abner Mikva explained, such a practice, though understandable, is dangerous. 
 
  Since the media are always looking for shorthand terms to describe complicated ideas, labeling by party is almost 
unavoidable.  But of all the efforts to simplify the complex, none is more mischevious than the willingness to reduce 
judges to their party registration or the political affiliations of their appointers. [FN234] 
 
  Despite this clear danger, even politicians and legal scholars play the partisan card.  California Governor Gray 
Davis announced that judges he appoints should vote his way on the death penalty, abortion, and gay marriage, and 
if they do not, they should resign. [FN235]  And legal scholars, "who should know better," accused the Florida 
Supreme Court of acting "lawlessly, for purely partisan motives." [FN236] 
 
  Mikva pointed out that the judiciary has internal checks; for example, judges who are outspoken about 
preconceived notions are subject to recusal when a relevant case comes up. [FN237]  Indeed, this happened to the 
first judge who was asked to rule on the Palm Beach County disputes because he had expressed strong views about 
the Clinton White House. [FN238]  Mikva explained that in most cases, judges do not have the opportunity to act on 
highly charged political questions, but rather "spend a lot of time addressing the minutia of statutory interpretation, 
into which the sweep of party platforms offers little or no insight." [FN239] 
 
  One law professor suggested that it is appropriate to criticize the reasoning of judges in particular cases, but there is 
a clear difference between critical analysis and accusations of bias. [FN240]  *621 The critics may be right if "the 
only credential judges bring to [a] dispute is a party label." [FN241]  But judges bring far more to the table.  
Allowing courts "to play their allocated role in our tripartite system-that of applying neutral principles to resolve 





  Because of the political stakes at risk in the resolution of the legal disputes surrounding the 2000 presidential 
election, the media and the public vociferously attacked adverse judicial opinions as mere partisan statements. 
Nothing will undermine the rule of law more than dismissing judges as politicians in black robes.  Even before Bush 
v. Gore, state judges have been facing unprecedented political pressure to conform their decisions to the will of the 
 
people rather than the rule of law.  This demonstrates a total disregard for the unique role an independent judiciary 
has been assigned in our constitutional democracy. 
 
  Although it may serve the short-term political objectives of some interest groups to destroy respect for judges and 
their decisions, such behavior tears asunder the separation-of-powers  framework devised by our Founders to 
preserve our core values.  No one has ever devised a better plan for protecting individual rights than separating the 
government into two branches wholly responsive to the majority and one branch protected from the majority so it 
can safeguard the liberty and rights of the  unpopular and powerless. 
 
  Well-intentioned and reasonable judges may differ in applying the law.  That does not reduce their decisions to 
partisan policy-making.  To uphold the confidence that we have placed in our courts, we must restore the view that 
judges decide disputes by applying respected legal principles, not by following political agendas.  Even when 
contravening legal principles lead judges to different results, we should be criticizing the legal principles at issue, 
not attacking the judge as a partisan. 
 
  The press and the public need to understand that while judges have discretion in interpreting the language of 
statutes and constitutional provisions, in finding facts and fashioning remedies, judges exercise their considerable 
power subject to significant *622 constraints.  Precedent weighs heavily in shaping judicial decisions: the manner in 
which disputes have been decided in the past compels reaching the same result in the present unless the facts or the 
law can be distinguished.  Judges serve with other judges, who either review their work on appeal or participate in 
consensual decision-making. [FN243]  Barring a constitutional impediment, if the judicial interpretation of a statute 
is considered wrongheaded, it can be rewritten by the legislature.  Whether a judge adopts a strict textual approach 
or a more dynamic approach to statutory interpretation, language as written by the legislature or an agency imposes 
meaningful restraints on judicial decision- making. 
 
  Judges are also constrained by respect: respect for the law and our constitutional system, their own self-respect, 
their desire to be respected by their peers and the legal community, and their understanding that they must earn the 
respect of the people they serve.  Courts can only resolve disputes peaceably if judges enjoy the trust and confidence 
of the public.  To accept unpopular decisions, the people must have confidence that judges are applying legal 
principles as they honestly understand them. 
 
  Nothing undermines public trust and confidence more than dismissing unpopular judicial opinions as partisan 
agendas or attacking judges as politicians. Judges, lawyers, journalists, and responsible citizens must decry this 
growing abuse of judges. [FN244]  One judge who has spoken out in defense of principled judicial decision-making 
is Alex Kozinski: "Woe be to us when that trust in the judiciary is lost." [FN245]  Judge Kozinski continues,  "The 
signs are on the horizon and ought not be ignored.  Throwing judges out of office because of how they voted on 
cases, rather than reservations about qualifications or personal integrity, seems to me a very serious cause for 
alarm." [FN246] 
 
  Justice Breyer has called our history of confidence in our *623 courts "a public treasure." [FN247]  The political 
fallout from Bush v. Gore initially appeared to threaten this confidence.  Justice Stevens warned in his dissent, "It is 
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.  
Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence . . . inflicted by today's decision." [FN248]  Time does seem to 
be healing any wound that the Supreme Court may have suffered by issuing such a politically charged decision.  
That Court appears to have retained or regained its voice of authority and the people's sense of trust as the justices 
have turned to the rest of the business of the term. 
 
  But other judges, especially state court judges, remain vulnerable to the disrespectful rhetoric and the political 
attacks.  Abraham Lincoln was right: "Public opinion in this country is everything." [FN249]  If judges are not held 
in high regard, if they are perceived as deciding cases to promote political agendas rather than to honor legal 
principles, our independent judiciary cannot survive.  John Adams's "profound conception" [FN250] of separating 
the powers of government and removing all political actors, including the people, from interfering with the 
deliberations of the judiciary will be lost.  There will be no trustee to enforce the rule of law; there will be no trustee 
to protect individual rights from the will of the majority. 
 
  Attention must be paid.  "It would be folly to squander this priceless constitutional gift to placate the clamors of 
 
benighted political partisans." [FN251]  Judges exercise great power.  Out of respect for their role as trustees of such 
valuable constitutional gifts, judges are constrained by legal principles and must explain those principles in their 
decisions.  Those who disagree with judicial opinions must recognize and criticize the underlying legal principles, 
not attack and abuse the judges or the courts.  Commentators must explain and we must accept that two judges or 
two courts can arrive at different legal conclusions and both be guided by sound legal principles.  Such differences 
do not warrant campaigns to slander courts generally or remove individual judges from office. 
 
  *624 Once we understand the unique role bestowed upon judges in this constitutional democracy, we must 
denounce every effort to replace public confidence in judges with distrust and disdain.  Highly partisan elections, 
contentious confirmation ordeals, vicious political attacks on judges who have the courage to make unpopular 
decisions--all diminish the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers deemed necessary to preserve 
individual rights and the rule of law.  By placing certain core values in trust for the benefit of all people for all times, 
the drafters of our constitution created a need for trustees to define and defend those values.  This role they entrusted 
to judges.  And they made sure that judges could deliberate and decide without interference by the executive or the 
legislature or the majority.  Now special interest groups and television broadcasters and narrow-minded politicians 
are clamoring to interfere with judicial decision-making.  We who are the intended beneficiaries of this grand 
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federal constitutional judges.  Id. at 659.  There is yet another layer of some 2000 hearing officers not classified as 
ALJs under the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id.  They have been called the "hidden judiciary," and they decide 
important matters such as immigration cases for the Justice Department, and disputes arising in the Department of 
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[FN62]. See 28 U.S.C. §  152(a)(1), (b) (1994); id. §  631(a), (e). 
 
 




[FN64]. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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[FN104]. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
 
[FN105]. See Bright, supra note 100, at 316-18; Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989) 
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[FN107]. Bright, supra note 100, at 310-11. 
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